Research
Peer-Reviewed Publications
İdrisoğlu, Işıl and William Spaniel. 2024. Information problems and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Conflict Management and Peace Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/073889422412385
Abstract
This paper explores the role of asymmetric information as a cause of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the classic bargaining model of war, negotiations break down when one side privately believes that it is sufficiently more likely perform better in battle than the other side expects. There is strong evidence that this mechanism was at play on the eve of the invasion. Chronic problems with Russian civil–military institutions created both an army unprepared for the conflict and a lack of awareness of this within the Kremlin. In contrast, Ukraine had reports of these problems and also had private information regarding its own resolve. Consequently, the Kremlin's demands on the eve of the conflict exceeded what Ukraine was willing to concede. Russia invaded as a result.
Spaniel,William and Işıl İdrisoğlu. 2024. Endogenous military strategy and crisis bargaining. Conflict Management and Peace Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231180499
Abstract
When states fight wars, they choose between multiple military strategies, e.g. whether to place boots on the ground or restrict efforts to an air campaign. We modify the standard crisis bargaining model to account for this by endogenizing a state's war strategy. Intuitively, states choose the more powerful strategy when the additional strength gained covers the additional costs of doing so. However, there is a counterintuitive second-order consequence of this. When stronger campaigns are expensive but still credible, states are more likely to reach a negotiated settlement to avoid the corresponding high costs. As the cost of the more powerful option increases, states substitute their actions with cheaper but weaker alternatives. Because of these lower costs, states become less likely to reach a settlement. In some cases, both parties may be worse off as a result.
Under Review
“Communicating Through Violence: Terrorism as a Strategy of Signaling and Recruitment.” Under review.
Recipient, Best Graduate Student Paper Award, Formal Models of Conflict Conference.
The Weakest Link: `De Facto States’ and Nuclear Security. Revise and resubmit, Europe-Asia Studies. with Eliza Gheorghe, Mursel Dogrul and Yanina Shved Dogrul
Working Papers
Tailoring Extremism: Strategic Framing of Religion in Jihadi Propaganda
Ideological Positioning and Recruitment Competition Among Insurgent Groups
Measuring Child Recruitment in Civil Wars Using Large Language Models: A New Actor-Level Dataset. With Merve Keskin and Rebecca Cordell
Child Recruitment and Legitimacy of Rebel Groups in Civil Wars. With Merve Keskin and Rebecca Cordell
Natural Resources and Child Recruitment in Civil Wars
Investigating Outgroup Support for Insurgencies in Ethnic Conflict: The Turkish Case